Philosophy and Psychological Disorders
On the Dilbert blog, by Scott Adams (http://dilbertblog.typepad.com/), he has been talking about free-will, and whether or not it exists. This was my response in his comments section:
Does it even matter whether or not free-will is an illusion, or false, or whatever? I mean, who cares? Does our knowledge of it being a true concept, or a false concept, actually affect our lives? I can't say that since I've read your blog about it that my actions or life has changed. So consideration of the topic is presumably irrelevant in this case. If we are programmed to act in ways as if free-will existed, then presumably it's ACTUAL existence doesn't matter.
So that's my opinion. But that started me wanting to write about the following, which didn't seem appropriate for his comments, so I thought, "I know, how about my blog...".
I recently decided that differing philosophical views, by which I mostly mean differing perceptions of the universe that prompt philosophical thinking and thus theories, are produced by slight, natural variations in brain chemistry. This seemed pretty obvious once I thought of it. I mean, what produces thoughts - brain, brain chemistry. What is philosophy - thoughts. So...duh. But you can go further than this somewhat inane basic truth.
For example, there is a disorder called something like "depersonalisation disorder". Actually, firstly I shall say, I believe that all psychological disorders exist on a spectrum, and that there is no set point or measure on this spectrum that determines whether or not you have a psychological "disease" or disorder or whatever. Said disease is present if your position on the psychological slider causes you distress or danger to yourself or others. This is similar to the actual definition of some disorders, which are defined as a set of symptoms PLUS causing the person distress. Without the distress the criteria are not fulfilled and the disorder is not medically present. Anyway - there is a slider and a spectrum. For example, a lot of people can think of some obsessive-compulsive habit they have, but it doesn't disrupt their life or make them seem crazy to other people. A lot of people have seen ghosts or felt creepy presences - maybe that is a mild hallucination? There is the Aspergers-Autism spectrum - some people have autism, some people have asperger's syndrome, some people are geeky and not good at interpersonal interaction, moving down the spectrum, until you get to "normal". And so on and so on. Most people can find some symptoms of psychological disorders in themselves, but that is just normal, just a reflection of the spectrum.
Back to depersonalisation disorder. One of the symptoms of this disorder is a feeling that one is observing ones thoughts from outside of them and that there is a separation between the observing "them" and the other "them" (probably, actually, physiologically true). This is also a philosophical belief. Some philosophical theories discuss the concept of observer within oneself. Are the people who thought of this idea simply further along the depersonalisation spectrum than those who didn't?
This also explains why some philosophical views that seem perfectly sensible and even logical to some people will seem absurd to you. Your brain chemistry just doesn't perceive the world that way, whereas theirs does. This to me makes philosophy all the more interesting. Instead of thinking to myself "That's stupid", I can now ponder the way the mind that developed the theory must have worked in order to produce that theory. For instance, when people say that scientifically or philosophically there is a self within a person that is separate from the thoughts and that can observe the thoughts, I say "well, duh". To me, that is like saying "below the waist there are two appendages called legs, they are the mechanism by which we walk". Well, duh. Other people might not believe this (the observing self theory) to be so self-evident. They are not as far along the depersonalisation spectrum as I am.
This relates back to the free-will argument thus: those who perceive to have free-will have a different brain chemistry to those that don't. Although it may be possible to change the minds of those in the middle of whatever spectrum produces these beliefs, presumably each view is actually self-evident to many of those that hold them. And thus, why would they change their minds?
I think that this theory is very useful in terms of understanding other people's points of view and beliefs - it gives a reason why others may think differently to you, and gives an incentive to understand their position. Understanding another person may retroactively explain a multitude of things other people have said and done which you just never got because you didn't have their brain chemistry so you didn't have their world view. Now that you have understood that another world view of a particular type exists, you can no doubt apply it to some of these other situations. It also relates very closely to the set of questions exemplified by "Do we all see the colour green the same way?", which gets you wondering - how else COULD you see green, and how would it change the world for that person? It also relates closely to the understanding of art - what method of thinking produced the artwork, what did the artist see and how did they think. Further to understanding art, I shall tell you that the more you think about artistic things and pursue artistic endeavours yourself, the more you will understand what art means and why certain pieces of it are good or interesting. I presume, therefore, that rather than a fixed brain chemistry, in some cases philosophical understandings are also produced from development of thought patterns that act in a certain way, like the understanding of art. But some world views are still based on your biology and unchangeable except in ways that your physiology changes, like with drugs or medications, and perhaps aging, hormones or things like that.
In a way, this further relates back to the free-will debate by providing an example of where something like a person's entire outlook on life and their take on the world is determined entirely by whether they have slightly more or slightly less of a particular molecule present in their brain. Thus providing less room for free-will. Of course, as expressed at the start of this entry, I am not particularly concerned either way about free-will; I think the argument is mostly meaningless and pointless.
(This contains a lot of generalisations - obviously there is a GREAT DEAL more to depersonalisation disorder, obviously people can change their minds about things in certain cases, obviously not all philosophical beliefs can be explained by existing, generalised psychological disorders, obviously I haven't thought of everything. However, my brain chemistry is telling me that the general principle of what I have said is self-evident....)
Notes on depersonalisation:
1. One symptom (pretty much the main one) is the feeling that one is detached from one's mental processes and body. It is not as simple as "observing one's own thoughts" like I've talked about, although one part of one description lists "observing the flow of ideas in the mind as independent" as a symptom. The similarity is there, and I believe there is probably a spectrum of how and how much one might experience this, in the variations of the human body and brain. Basically, information on this disorder sat in my mind for a long time until it produced these thoughts.
2. Many people experience severe depersonalisation at some point in their life, mainly in response to trauma or stress.
3. A related disorder is derealisation. Some times these disorders are grouped together under one or other of the names. Sometimes people experience both disorders at the same time. If experienced frequently, especially in a mild form so that it seemed "normal", I think it would also prompt interesting observances on the nature of reality.
4. If you decide to search for information on these disorders, some (most) people spell them with a"z", eg. depersonalization.
Links:
http://www.depersonalizationdisorder.net/index.html
http://www.dpselfhelp.com/
http://www.dreamchild.net/
Does it even matter whether or not free-will is an illusion, or false, or whatever? I mean, who cares? Does our knowledge of it being a true concept, or a false concept, actually affect our lives? I can't say that since I've read your blog about it that my actions or life has changed. So consideration of the topic is presumably irrelevant in this case. If we are programmed to act in ways as if free-will existed, then presumably it's ACTUAL existence doesn't matter.
So that's my opinion. But that started me wanting to write about the following, which didn't seem appropriate for his comments, so I thought, "I know, how about my blog...".
I recently decided that differing philosophical views, by which I mostly mean differing perceptions of the universe that prompt philosophical thinking and thus theories, are produced by slight, natural variations in brain chemistry. This seemed pretty obvious once I thought of it. I mean, what produces thoughts - brain, brain chemistry. What is philosophy - thoughts. So...duh. But you can go further than this somewhat inane basic truth.
For example, there is a disorder called something like "depersonalisation disorder". Actually, firstly I shall say, I believe that all psychological disorders exist on a spectrum, and that there is no set point or measure on this spectrum that determines whether or not you have a psychological "disease" or disorder or whatever. Said disease is present if your position on the psychological slider causes you distress or danger to yourself or others. This is similar to the actual definition of some disorders, which are defined as a set of symptoms PLUS causing the person distress. Without the distress the criteria are not fulfilled and the disorder is not medically present. Anyway - there is a slider and a spectrum. For example, a lot of people can think of some obsessive-compulsive habit they have, but it doesn't disrupt their life or make them seem crazy to other people. A lot of people have seen ghosts or felt creepy presences - maybe that is a mild hallucination? There is the Aspergers-Autism spectrum - some people have autism, some people have asperger's syndrome, some people are geeky and not good at interpersonal interaction, moving down the spectrum, until you get to "normal". And so on and so on. Most people can find some symptoms of psychological disorders in themselves, but that is just normal, just a reflection of the spectrum.
Back to depersonalisation disorder. One of the symptoms of this disorder is a feeling that one is observing ones thoughts from outside of them and that there is a separation between the observing "them" and the other "them" (probably, actually, physiologically true). This is also a philosophical belief. Some philosophical theories discuss the concept of observer within oneself. Are the people who thought of this idea simply further along the depersonalisation spectrum than those who didn't?
This also explains why some philosophical views that seem perfectly sensible and even logical to some people will seem absurd to you. Your brain chemistry just doesn't perceive the world that way, whereas theirs does. This to me makes philosophy all the more interesting. Instead of thinking to myself "That's stupid", I can now ponder the way the mind that developed the theory must have worked in order to produce that theory. For instance, when people say that scientifically or philosophically there is a self within a person that is separate from the thoughts and that can observe the thoughts, I say "well, duh". To me, that is like saying "below the waist there are two appendages called legs, they are the mechanism by which we walk". Well, duh. Other people might not believe this (the observing self theory) to be so self-evident. They are not as far along the depersonalisation spectrum as I am.
This relates back to the free-will argument thus: those who perceive to have free-will have a different brain chemistry to those that don't. Although it may be possible to change the minds of those in the middle of whatever spectrum produces these beliefs, presumably each view is actually self-evident to many of those that hold them. And thus, why would they change their minds?
I think that this theory is very useful in terms of understanding other people's points of view and beliefs - it gives a reason why others may think differently to you, and gives an incentive to understand their position. Understanding another person may retroactively explain a multitude of things other people have said and done which you just never got because you didn't have their brain chemistry so you didn't have their world view. Now that you have understood that another world view of a particular type exists, you can no doubt apply it to some of these other situations. It also relates very closely to the set of questions exemplified by "Do we all see the colour green the same way?", which gets you wondering - how else COULD you see green, and how would it change the world for that person? It also relates closely to the understanding of art - what method of thinking produced the artwork, what did the artist see and how did they think. Further to understanding art, I shall tell you that the more you think about artistic things and pursue artistic endeavours yourself, the more you will understand what art means and why certain pieces of it are good or interesting. I presume, therefore, that rather than a fixed brain chemistry, in some cases philosophical understandings are also produced from development of thought patterns that act in a certain way, like the understanding of art. But some world views are still based on your biology and unchangeable except in ways that your physiology changes, like with drugs or medications, and perhaps aging, hormones or things like that.
In a way, this further relates back to the free-will debate by providing an example of where something like a person's entire outlook on life and their take on the world is determined entirely by whether they have slightly more or slightly less of a particular molecule present in their brain. Thus providing less room for free-will. Of course, as expressed at the start of this entry, I am not particularly concerned either way about free-will; I think the argument is mostly meaningless and pointless.
(This contains a lot of generalisations - obviously there is a GREAT DEAL more to depersonalisation disorder, obviously people can change their minds about things in certain cases, obviously not all philosophical beliefs can be explained by existing, generalised psychological disorders, obviously I haven't thought of everything. However, my brain chemistry is telling me that the general principle of what I have said is self-evident....)
Notes on depersonalisation:
1. One symptom (pretty much the main one) is the feeling that one is detached from one's mental processes and body. It is not as simple as "observing one's own thoughts" like I've talked about, although one part of one description lists "observing the flow of ideas in the mind as independent" as a symptom. The similarity is there, and I believe there is probably a spectrum of how and how much one might experience this, in the variations of the human body and brain. Basically, information on this disorder sat in my mind for a long time until it produced these thoughts.
2. Many people experience severe depersonalisation at some point in their life, mainly in response to trauma or stress.
3. A related disorder is derealisation. Some times these disorders are grouped together under one or other of the names. Sometimes people experience both disorders at the same time. If experienced frequently, especially in a mild form so that it seemed "normal", I think it would also prompt interesting observances on the nature of reality.
4. If you decide to search for information on these disorders, some (most) people spell them with a"z", eg. depersonalization.
Links:
http://www.depersonalizationdisorder.net/index.html
http://www.dpselfhelp.com/
http://www.dreamchild.net/
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